Microsoft's new strategy for the mobile market, if rumors prove correct, will involve porting two separate mobile operating systems onto smartphones. Could it serve Microsoft's attempts to solidify its falling share in the mobile OS market space? That's a big "maybe" - especially since Microsoft's previous mobile strategies have the potential to place a howitzer against Redmond's own foot.

According to an Aug. 19 article in the Digitimes, Microsoft's upcoming strategy against Android and the iPhone OS involves dual Mobile OS platforms: Windows Mobile 6.5, slated to launch at the beginning of October, and "Windows Mobile 7" due to roll out in the fourth quarter of 2010.

"Sources at Taiwan handset makers" apparently told the article's authors that the "dual-platform strategy will allow Microsoft to compete with Android-based platform using Windows Mobile 6.5 and also compete with iPhones leveraging Windows Mobile 7."

Given the relative paucity of rumors leaking about the potential capabilities of Mobile 7, which will supposedly provide a "premium" mobile experience centered on multitouch, it's difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of this proposed strategy; but I can see one big challenge that Microsoft faces in implementing it: providing a big enough ecosystem.

It's a timing thing. When Microsoft launches Windows Marketplace for Mobile in October, it hopes to have 600 applications available for download - one of the reasons why it opened the store to application submissions from developers in July. Even if those 600 are ready to go, however, Microsoft will still find itself playing a substantial game of catch-up against Apple, Research In Motion and Palm, all of whom have been building their own mobile-application ecosystems for months or (in the case of Apple's App Store) over a year.

How could Microsoft overcome its rivals' ecosystem advantage? If Redmond tied the launch of Windows Marketplace for Mobile, or even Windows Mobile 7, to a particularly hot smartphone (something with a form-factor and functionality that could compete with the Pre or next-generation iPhone) then the resulting momentum might allow them to make a significant marketplace dent. Take the Palm Pre as an example of how to correctly execute this particular rollout model; launched along with Palm's Web OS and a memorable-yet-creepy ad campaign, the device posted solid sales and app-download numbers in its first month of release.

Rumors of a Microsoft smartphone have seemingly been drifting around the Internet for months, most of them centered on "Project Pink." If the scuttlebutt turns out to be grounded in some sort of reality, then the resulting device will need something to truly differentiate itself within the smartphone market - and by "something," I don't mean the iPhone's newly discovered "iGrenade" App.

But then Microsoft has another issue: its recent deal with Nokia. The partnership to roll out a mobile version of Microsoft Office onto Nokia's phones (which run Symbian, not Windows Mobile) may seem like a solid way for both companies to compete effective against RIM - but once you start porting your key functionality onto devices not running a version of your operating system, you rob potential customers of a reason to acquire a device with your operating system.

Other manufacturers recognize this principle, which is one of the reasons why Apple seems so determined to shut down Palm's ability to run iTunes on the Pre. But if Microsoft continues to export applications onto other operating systems, it could ultimately hurt Windows Mobile - and any future smartphones using it.